point to increased dollarization following successful policy reforms. Table 1 shows an increase in loan dollarization from 47 percent in 1985 to 84 percent in 1987. At least for policymakers interested in autonomy, it is of interest to determine factors that inhibit returns to domestic currency use following successful stabilizations. Kamin and Ericsson (1993) , in the first extensive empirical study of currency hysteresis, consider macroeconomic factors, such as domestic inflation, that reflect policy. They find, for example, that the maximum past domestic inflation rate for a dollarized country has a statistically significant "ratchet" effect on dollarization. The larger is maximum past inflation, the more likely it is for dollarization to persist. It remains of interest to determine the underlying factors that give rise to such ratcheting. Factors receiving recent theoretical attention are transaction costs and financial adaptation. Guidotti and Rodriguez (1991) , for example, construct a transaction cost model with a neutral band for inflation, within which there is no incentive to dedollarize.
Switching back to domestic currency following dollarization will occur only if domestic inflation is low enough to overcome a transaction cost differential between use of dollars versus the domestic currency. Sturzenegger (1992) extends the theory by emphasizing scale economies and financial adaptation as forces behind hysteresis effects driven by transactions costs. This paper follows the recent line of transaction cost explanations of dollarization and hysteresis by constructing a transaction cost model with network externalities associated with currency use. Implications of the model are analyzed using data from informal Bolivian markets for dollar and domestic currency loans along with measures of currency network effects. Section I of the paper presents a transaction cost model of dollarization and empirically tractable implications for decisions to borrow and lend in dollars versus domestic currency.
Section II discusses the informal Bolivian loan market. Section III applies a structural probit estimation procedure to the data. Section IV provides quantitative results. Section V concludes.
I. A transaction cost model of a dollarized economy
Consider a model with a single good and identical multi-member households, each consisting of a financial intermediary, goods seller, and shopper. Each period, shoppers buy goods from sellers using domestic currency (Bolivian in our case) and foreign currency (U.S. dollars) obtained by borrowing from intermediaries. For convenience, Table 2 lists and describes variables used in the model. We use * superscripts to denote variables denominated in dollars. Lower case household decision variables represent quantities demanded while upper case represents quantities supplied.
We proceed by describing specific trading opportunities facing the intermediary, seller, and shopper members of a typical household.
I.A. Intermediary
At nominal exchange rate e the intermediary divides the household's beginning of period nominal t wealth according to:
M + e M = L + e L <1> The shopper's costs also depend on currency network externalities from dollar usage.
These factors, present here on the demand side of the loan market, are represented by T . We d t assume that >0 and <0, so that as T increases, the increased experience with and
2,3 t adaptation to dollar-denominated transactions will increase consumer benefits by reducing the marginal cost of borrowing and spending dollars. Section IV describes empirical proxies that we use to capture the demand side externality effects.
As with the intermediary, policy credibility enters as POL in shoppers' transactions cost t functions. We specify that the marginal cost of borrowing in Bolivian currency (dollars) rises (falls or is unchanged), the lower is Bolivian policy credibility, i.e., an increase in POL is taken t to capture a decline in domestic policy credibility and >0, <0. 
Conditions <5> and <6> indicate that the shopper borrows up to where the marginal transaction value of each currency equals the marginal interest cost. Condition <7>, associated with the intermediary's loan supply, gives interest rate parity in the presence of transactions cost effects.
To arrive at relations suitable for estimation, we assume the following cost functional forms:
<8> and <9> into <5> and <6> gives loan demands:
<10>

<11>
Bolivian currency (dollar) loan demand is decreasing (increasing) in externality index T , and is d t negatively related to the cost of borrowing R (R ).
t t * Similarly, we specify the intermediary's transaction cost functions as:
where i>0 for i=1,3; i>0 for i=1,2; 2>0; and 3>0. Differentiating and substituting the results into <7> gives dollar loan supply:
<14>
Given (l /P ), <14> implies that the dollar loan supply is increasing (decreasing) in the dollar t t (Bolivian) interest rate R (R ). Dollar loan supply also is positively related to expected exchange
loan market equilibrium conditions. Substituting (l /P ) from <10> for (L /P ) in <14> to impose
where signs of the partial derivatives are shown below each variable.
To proceed toward estimation, the functional relations governing dollar loan supply (L /P ) and demand (l /P ) can be summarized by two linear regressions:
Combining the above regression equations gives the following reduced-form relations:
Equation <15> provides direction for the empirical modeling of Bolivian loan dollarization.
According to <15>, dollar loans increase with a decrease in the Bolivian currency denominated interest rate R ; an increase in expected Bolivian currency depreciation E (e /e ); a rise in dollar t t t+1 t networking factors T and T ; and a deterioration in Bolivian policy credibility POL . 
II. Data issues
Agricultural areas in Bolivia have active informal loan markets together with underdeveloped formal financial markets. Data on loans in informal markets are available from records kept by local claims judges. We employ such data here, which were collected in a USAID study by Ladman and Luna (1988) . Generally, loans in the informal market are from individual to individual and are denominated in either Bolivian currency or U.S. dollars. Lenders demand 5 registration of loans with claims judges so that legal documentation exists for collection purposes.
Hence, one can expect the loan records to adequately represent actual lending practices. The data that we employ are a set of daily loan records for three towns in the Bolivian Upper Cochabamba region. The complete data set contains 8,284 observations from loan records dating January 1, 1980, through July 15, 1987. We exclude, however, loan records from November 1982 through
September 1985 when dollar-denominated contracts were illegal.
To account for factors that influence the choice of currency in a loan, dollarization implications of equation <15> will be cast in terms of a binary choice problem of which currency
to use in a loan. Our empirical treatment is to regress the probability of a dollar-denominated loan on variables expected to impact the probability in the same fashion as the explanatory factors for loan choices indicated by <15>. Straightforward probit analysis is not allowed by our data, however, because of the sample selection bias that, whenever a loan is observed in the data, only the interest rate relevant for that particular currency loan is recorded. In the case of a dollardenominated loan, for example, the related Bolivian currency interest rate prevailing at the time of the loan is not observed. To account for this latent variable, a three-step estimation procedure of Lee (1979) is applied. Lee's procedure supplies consistent estimates of unobserved interest rates.
III. Structural probit analysis
To cast implications from equation <15> into an empirical currency choice setting we record the dependent variable in <15> as CURR =1 if a loan is denominated in dollars and CUMVALUE: Cumulative daily dollar to total value of loans recorded up to but excluding time t.
The share of prior loans denominated in dollars is taken to serve as a gauge for positive effects on dollar-loan demand of a growing dollar-user network.
To capture loan supply-side externality factors in T we use the following proxies: s EXSPREAD: Differential between the black market and official Bolivian currency to dollar exchange rate.
BANKSPREAD: Percentage spread of the average lending over borrowing rate on domestic currency loans in the official Bolivian banking system.
Supply-side network effects from dollar usage, T , identify an increased (decreased) incentive for s lenders to offer dollar-denominated (Bolivian currency) financial instruments in the informal banking sector. The greater the misalignment of the official exchange rate, i.e., the larger EXSPREAD, the greater the lenders' profit potential from supplying dollars informally.
Similarly, the larger the financial risk of Bolivian currency loans in the official banking sector, the greater the propensity for dollar lending in the informal market.
To isolate hysteresis effects on dollarization that are associated with lack of domestic policy credibility from effects associated with network externalities, we include POLICY proxies in <16>. Five POLICY proxies are considered:
BOLINFLVOL: Realized monthly volatility in the Bolivian inflation rate as measured by the consumer price index.
BOLDEPVOL: Realized monthly volatility in the black market depreciation rate.
INFMAX: Past maximum Bolivian inflation rate.
INFVOLMAX: Past maximum Bolivian inflation volatility.
DEPVOLMAX: Past maximum parallel market depreciation volatility.
The first two of the POLICY proxies are used to capture negative monetary policy expectations.
The remaining three proxies are "ratchet variables" to capture learning or expectations adjustment periods before domestic agents become convinced that current macroeconomic stability has permanence and inflationary policies will not be repeated. Persistence in agents' negative policy outlooks can introduce ratchet effects, as in Kamin and Ericsson (1993) .
Regression equation <17> also contains dummy variables. REFORM85 captures the
Bolivian stabilization policy announced in August 1985 and accounts for the break in the data set.
It is set to zero until October 1, 1985 (the first observation following legalization of dollar holdings) and is one thereafter. Dummies are also included for seasonal lending patterns in the largely agricultural Cochabamba region. The harvest period is in the South American fall (March, April, May) and is captured by the constant term. DUMWIN is set to one if a loan occurred in June, July, or August; DUMSPR is one if a loan was in September, October, or November; and DUMSUM is one for loans in December, January, or February.
IV. Probit results
Results from estimating the structural probit in <17> are shown in Tables 3 to 6 . To avoid multicollinearity, only one demand-side (T ) and one supply-side (T ) externality proxy is Based on the likelihood ratio test statistics and the percentage of correct 0-1 predictions, the empirical model provides a good fit. According to the empirical results for equation <16>, the probability of a dollar-denominated loan falls significantly with a higher Bolivian interest rate estimate, and there is generally a positive association with the depreciation rate of the domestic currency against the dollar. Also, as the theory predicts, the probability of a dollar loan rises significantly when there is an increase in the network externality variables. Both the T and T d s t t proxies exhibit statistically significant positive effects on dollarization. This result is robust to the inclusion of different proxies capturing lack of policy credibility.
Considered individually, the ratchet variables raise the probability of a dollar-denominated loan. However, in estimations not reported here it was found that INFMAX, INFVOLMAX, and DEPVOLMAX become insignificant when included with REFORM85 in the same regression.
This implies that the ratchet variables may capture more than just lack of policy credibility. They also proxy for the break in the data and, specifically, legalization of dollar contracts after the hyperinflation. To deal with the problem, as identified earlier, REFORM85 is included separately in the regression. Its highly significant positive estimate captures the data break, while macroeconomic policy changes enter separately through BOLINFVOL and BOLDEPVOL. In line with the theory, the results indicate that the larger the monthly inflation and depreciation volatility, the greater the uncertainty about Bolivian macroeconomic policy and, hence, the more likely a switch to dollar loans.
The results also identify seasonalities in the pattern of dollar relative to Bolivian currency loans. Loans made in the South American fall, the main harvest season, are reflected in the constant term. The three dummies for other seasons exhibit negative coefficients, although only DUMSPR is statistically significant. So, relative to the fall season, the probability of a dollar loan is lowest in the South American spring. Winter and summer seasons do not significantly alter the probability of a dollar loan, as observed for the main harvest period.
V. Simulation
Since probit is nonlinear, coefficient estimates do not constitute relevant partial derivatives. Instead, the results must be interpreted at particular values for the independent variables. A common approach is to evaluate probabilities at sample means for all variables that simply serve as controls and to compute effects of a one-standard-deviation increase in a variable of interest. This approach is used in Table 7 to gauge the relative importance of network externality and policy credibility proxies on dollarization. RBOL , DEX, REFORM85 and * seasonal dummies are set at their mean values. Eight simulation results are presented.
Note in Table 7 that the base probability of a dollar loan is higher when the official domestic interest rate differential (BANKSPREAD) is included--panels C and D--than when the Bolivian exchange rate spread (EXSPREAD) is included as a T proxy--panels A and B. There is only a slight mean probability difference when CUMLOANS is replaced by CUMVALUE as a demand-side externality proxy. For instance, a combination of CUMVALUE, BOLDEPVOL, and BANKSPREAD produces a probability estimate of .7157 as opposed to .7291 when CUMLOANS is employed (third row of column 1, panels C and D). The largest difference arises in a pairing with EXSPREAD and BOLDEPVOL where, using CUMLOANS, the probability of a dollar loan is .5793 versus .4960 by including CUMVALUE (third row of column 1, panels A and B).
The economic significance of the network externality proxies is seen by calculating probability changes associated with a one-standard-deviation increase in the respective variables.
The largest economic impact is from changes in the demand-side proxies. For example, when CUMVALUE, EXSPREAD, and BOLDEPVOL are combined and the cumulative dollar to total loan value increases by one standard deviation, the probability of a dollar-denominated loan rises from .4960 to .5714 (third row of columns 1 and 2, panel B). This probability increase of 7.5
percentage points indicates that CUMVALUE has a significant economic effect on dollarization.
The effect is still positive but somewhat smaller when Bolivian inflation volatility, BOLINFVOL, replaces Bolivian depreciation volatility, BOLDEPVOL, as a policy proxy (first row of columns 1 and 2, panel B) and when CUMLOAN replaces CUMVALUE (first row of columns 1 and 2, panel A).
On the loan supply side, externality effects reflected in changes in the Bolivian bank interest spread have the weakest impact on changes in dollarization. Combining BANKSPREAD with CUMLOANS, the probability of a dollar loan rises by 1 (1.6) percent when BOLINFVOL (BOLDEPVOL) is included and BANKSPREAD increases by one standard deviation (rows 1 and 3, panel C). With the same grouping, but with BANKSPREAD replaced by EXSPREAD, a onestandard-deviation increase in the exchange rate differential is associated with a probability increase of 3 (2.3) percentage points (rows 1 and 3, panel A).
Turning to an isolation of policy effects, note that adjustments in the policy credibility proxies, BOLINFVOL and BOLDEPVOL, do not significantly influence the probability of a dollar loan. When combining CUMVALUE and EXSPREAD, for example, a one-standarddeviation increase in Bolivian inflation volatility (depreciation volatility) raises the probability of a dollar loan by 3.3 (2.4) percent (column 1, panels A and B). The probability increase declines to about 2 percent when EXSPREAD is replaced by BANKSPREAD (column 1, panels C and D).
Hence, drastic reductions in inflation variability or depreciation variability would be necessary before any economically significant decline in dollarization is observed.
These results indicate that once externality effects from dollar usage are in place, it is difficult for policymakers to achieve economically significant reductions in dollarization. The implementation of new goods pricing and financial market structures to accommodate dollar usage has led to significant reductions in transaction costs of dollar usage relative to Bolivian currency usage. To achieve widespread dedollarization, large incentives would have to be provided to overcome the transactions cost savings. One such incentive could be in the form of significant reductions in domestic relative to U.S. inflation or its variability. Our results suggest, however, that small-scale fiscal and monetary policy restrictions, even if successful, may not be sufficient to overcome dollarization.
VI. Conclusion
This paper identifies network externalities from currency acceptability as a key determinant of observed currency hysteresis. Network externality effects on domestic versus U.S.
dollar usage in loan markets in Bolivia are quantified using macroeconomic observations together with data from informal loan markets. The probability of observing a dollar-denominated loan in a particular region of Bolivia is shown to be positively related to various proxies capturing positive network effects to agents from dollar usage. The statistical significance of these network proxies is robust to inclusion of macroeconomic policy-credibility variables. The results suggest that even credible and successful policy reforms may not be sufficient to overcome dollarization once network benefits from dollar usage become embedded in transactions. 
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APPENDIX
Applying Lee's procedure to our context involves three steps. In the first step, a "reduced-form" probit is estimated for the probability of a dollar-denominated loan, based on <17>, where the Bolivian interest rate is replaced by its exogenous determinants. This probit regression is then used to construct an inverse Mills ratio for each sample observation. The inverse Mills ratio is =h( N )/H( N ), where is a vector of probit coefficients and is a matrix of all independent variables from the reduced-form equation. h(@) and H(@) are the normal and cumulative density functions, respectively. accounts for the truncation in the probability distribution when the Bolivian interest rate is unobservable. The second step of the procedure is to enter the estimated inverse Mills-ratio value into an OLS subsample regression where Bolivian interest rate observations form the dependent variable. The third step substitutes the fitted interest rate values into a "structural" probit model of equation <17>, which is estimated over the entire sample. Results from the third-step structural probit are in section III of the text.
The reduced-form probit that we estimate in the first step of Lee's procedure is:
The exogenous determinants of the Bolivian interest rates are:
AMOUNT: Loans are made in either U.S. dollars or Bolivian currency. Over the sample period used, there were 4,269 domestic and 1,492 dollar loans registered. The mean loan size of $588
and maximum loan of $16,320 imply a small economic scale of loan activity.
TERM: The mean loan maturity is three months. The longest loan spanned 60 months. The short 3. An analogous relation can be derived for the domestic loan supply.
4. We abstract from the consumption effects for empirical purposes because there are no appropriate consumption proxies at the daily periodicity that loans are observed.
5. Pesos were the official Bolivian currency prior to January 1987. Thereafter, Bolivianos became legal tender. The conversion rate is 1 Boliviano = 1 million pesos. 
